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Abstract: A standard rationale for intellectual property is that by awarding a monopoly
to innovators the government increases the amount of social surplus appropriated from
invention, thereby improving efficiency. Indeed, if an inventor can appropriate the full
surplus from his invention the first best will be obtained. We observe that while full
appropriation is sufficient for efficiency, it is not necessary – in fact full appropriation by
marginal individuals is sufficient. We then show how in a world in which competitors are
strategic agents competition is less fierce over marginal contributions, and as a result
government awards of monopoly may be socially undesirable.
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1. Introduction
One goal of intellectual property is to increase the proportion of social surplus
accruing to the innovator. From a formal point of view Ostroy [1980, 1984] and Ostroy
and Makowski [1984, 2001] pioneered the idea of the marginal contribution of an
individual to society. They were able to capture a common intuition and show that if
everyone is able to fully appropriate their individual contribution to social surplus,
perfect competition and efficiency are obtained. In fact, they identify the idea of perfect
competition with that of full appropriation
Our answer is that a perfect competitor is a full appropriator: whatever quantities
the perfect competitor supplies, the amounts he extracts from the rest of the
economy in exchange are such that others are indifferent between trading with the
perfect competitor or not trading with him at all. [2001, p. 498]
This idea is particularly relevant to the study of innovation, and of intellectual property in
particular. Following along the lines of Ostroy and Makowski, insofar as copyrights and
patents enable creators and innovators to appropriate a large part of the surplus created by
their ingenuity, it should lead to nearly efficient outcomes. In particular, Ostroy and
Makowski seem to suggest that a fully efficient level of economic innovation is achieved
only when the private benefits innovators appropriate from their participation in the
market coincide with the social benefits they contribute to the other side of the market.
Interestingly enough, this idea is implicit in the conventional view of innovation
as due to monopoly power based upon intellectual property, argued, among many many
other, by Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1999]
It would be efficient ex post to make the existing discoveries freely available to all
producers, but this practice fails to provide the ex ante incentives for further
inventions. A tradeoff arises between restrictions on the use of existing ideas and
the rewards to inventive activity.2
Indeed, the idea that there is a trade-off between the appropriation of surplus at the
margin and infra-marginal distortion of additional monopoly power has a long history in
the literature on industrial organization: Nordhaus [1969] is one early contribution along
these lines; recent empirical study of the trade-off can be found in Boldrin and Levine
[2009].
Nevertheless, when we consider what Ostroy and Makowski [2001, p. 479-480]
call “opportunistic behavior” – game-theoretical considerations, if you like – it becomes
clear that the conventional view is problematic. What happens, in other words, when the
competitive actors in the model instead of taking price as given choose what to do in an
opportunistic and forward-looking fashion?  To quote
Portraying the individual as a pricetaker was extremely useful for displaying the
new equi-marginal principle underlying individual choice. But it had the
unfortunate consequence of suppressing the entrepreneurial side of competition.
Entrepreneurs are innovative individuals, that is individuals capable of “enlarging
the production set” by using old commodities in a novel fashion and thereby obtaining a
new, previously unknown commodity. Schumpeter’s five different forms of innovation
all boil down to this, most obvious one. This we call an innovation, and we follow upon
the Makowski/Ostroy invitation
Our image of the perfect competitor is someone who is active and innovative.
Rather than dealing with an impersonal market, perfect competitors interact with
one another in an environment involving intense rivalry. A perfect competitor will
do whatever he can to increase his gain: bargaining vigorously with others for a
better deal, innovating new products if he sees a profit to doing so, ...
In doing so we blow some strategic life into the flaccid body of the Schumpeterian
innovators and imitators of standard “new growth theory” – the theory by which
technological fixed costs and increasing returns are the essence of anything good that has
ever happened to humans since the inception of civilization.3
Let us start with the conventional model of innovation and imitation. Suppose that
copies of a new good may be produced by anyone at a common constant marginal cost
and without a capacity constraint, as the models of new growth theory assume. Suppose
also that the market is extremely competitive – that in fact there is Bertrand competition
so that each agent tries to beat the other one by lowering the asking price so as to capture
the entire market. This can be justified by opportunistic behavior if issues of private
information are set aside and all imitators are assumed to access the same technology
once they have paid the setup cost. Then as soon as a single imitator enters the market
price is forced to marginal cost and profits to zero – there is no surplus left over to pay
the fixed cost of the creator. We reach the standard conclusion, as in Barro and Sala-i-
Martin and many others: ex ante nobody would be willing to pay the fixed cost of
creation.
So far so good. It is not unreasonable to imagine, though, that competitors
copying the innovator’s product face at least some small fixed cost of entering the market
– reverse engineering the new product, setting up a production line, or website to
distribute copies, and so forth. This fixed cost may be considerably smaller than that of
the original creator, but no matter. Since each of these potential rivals knows that the
moment they enter the market for the new good, competitive (in the sense of Bertrand)
price determination forces the price to drop to marginal cost, they too face the prospect of
zero profits – and will be unwilling to enter the market. If the original creator cannot pay
for her fixed cost, imitators cannot either. Pulling this back, we see that the original
creator should innovate if – with the share of social surplus generated by a monopoly –
she can cover her fixed costs. For if she can, she can be secure in her knowledge that no
rival will wish to create cut-throat competition by entering. In other words, under the very
mild assumption that imitators face a positive fixed cost of entry, the discovery can be
made freely available to all producers ex post, as the threat of competition is enough to
guarantee the innovator’s position of monopoly.
3
Indeed, even in the limiting case where the fixed cost of entry is zero, there are
two equilibria under the assumption that the discovery is made freely available to
everyone  ex post. In one, considered earlier, there is no discovery and if the creator were
                                                
3 Henry and Ponce [2009] follow this line in a different direction examining the incentive of innovators to
wait following an initial innovation.4
to step off the equilibrium path and innovate, she would be faced by the immediate entry
of imitators. In the other, the creator innovates if a monopoly covers the fixed cost – and
the rivals, being indifferent, choose not to enter. So the conventional wisdom summarized
by Barro and Sala-i-Martin holds only under the assumption of costless entry, and then
only for the equilibrium that is the least plausible in the sense that it is not robust to the
assumption of tiny fixed costs of entry. With small fixed costs of entry and when the
participants in this market are forward looking competitors, appropriation through
monopoly is the outcome – and there is no need for intellectual property to appropriate
the (share of the) social surplus the innovator needs to find motivation for her creative
effort.
This highlights the basic point about intellectual property: to what extent is it
useful, or even necessary, to appropriate surplus? To move beyond the improbable
assumption of instantaneous Bertrand competition with unlimited capacity, we begin by
observing that, strictly speaking, the full appropriation condition of Makowski and
Ostroy is necessary only for marginal discoveries and marginal inventors. This is because
creators and their creations differ in the amount of social surplus they deliver relative to
the cost of invention. “High quality” discoveries – tied to “high quality” innovators – for
which the social surplus greatly exceeds the fixed cost of creation, require only limited
appropriability to guarantee that they are produced. The fixed cost of creating high
quality new goods would require appropriating their full social surplus if (and only if) the
opportunity cost of their creators were uniformly as high as said social surplus. That is to
say: only under the special conditions in which, no matter which occupation the innovator
chooses and which activity she carries out, the social value of her product is (uniformly)
“high”, her opportunity cost of innovating will match the social surplus she is generating
in the specific innovation being considered. In the, admittedly more general not to say
more realistic, case in which the innovator generates a high social surplus by doing X, but
a smaller one by doing Y, the fixed cost to be recovered to make it incentive-compatible
to create X amounts only to the full social surplus generated by Y. When my choice of
occupation is between being a rock star and filling tanks at the gas pump, all that is
needed is my gas attendant salary plus epsilon to convince me to choose rock-stardom.
This observation suggests that it is “marginal” discoveries – or, “marginal”
innovators – for which the social surplus only barely exceeds the fixed cost of creation5
that require a high degree of appropriability to guarantee they are produced.
4 Moreover,
leaving aside the Bertrand case, we might expect the “free” market to produce more
competition over goods for which social surplus is great than over those for which social
surplus is small. That is, for a given ability to extract a share of social surplus, and a
given fixed cost of entry, we would expect more entry – and more competition – over
“high quality” discoveries. In other words, while government guarantees of monopoly
treat marginal and high quality discoveries alike – or, since the rich have better access to
government favors, favor the high quality over the marginal quality – competition by its
nature is more generous to the marginal discoverer. And the marginal discoverer is the
one whom, when aiming at social efficiency, we most need to encourage. Our goal here is
to highlight – in a simple example – the latter point by illustrating how competition is less
fierce for “low quality” discoveries than for “high quality” discoveries, and consequently
how the artificial legal constraint of intellectual property may simply reduce the
usefulness of innovations without actually encouraging creation. 
5
2. The Model
For computational simplicity we assume there is a single good to be created and
that demand for that good is linear. If Q  is the quantity (the number of copies) of the good
consumed, we imagine that the margin between price and (the constant) marginal cost of
making copies for creator and imitators alike is given by    	 PVQ  , where   V   is
the social value of the discovery.
6 To make the discovery, the innovator must pay a fixed
cost of !& , where   ! p  is a constant. Imitators or copiers, by way of contrast, must
pay only &  in order to reverse engineer the discovery and enter the market.
7
                                                
4 The crucial role of marginal innovation is also recognized by Pollack [2008a,b] who uses a Stackelberg
model of entry and zero fixed cost of imitation to analyze the amount of innovation that will occur without
intellectual property and the differential impact of IP across industries. Pollack places particular emphasis
on the important point that the marginal innovation is the one that is the least socially costly if it does not
take place.
5 In the model, not only may overall efficiency be reduced by intellectual property due to the fact that all
innovations are less useful – but, as we show, in the presence of legal costs, the total amount of innovation
is not increased.
6 That is to say, linear demand with constant marginal cost.
7 Note that, as is usual in this literature, we consider only the single alternative: innovate or do not innovate.
Of course, in practice there can be choice of innovation types or levels and this decision may be affected by
the presence or not of intellectual property.6
We consider a simple model of Cournot competition.
8 The rationale behind this
choice is that of Kreps and Scheinkman [1983] – firms must choose capacity before
entering the market and competing over prices. The timing in the market is as follows.
First, the creator decides whether or not to innovate. If the creator innovates, she then
produces an initial run of  ￿ Q  units of output. Before this output can hit the market, but
after it is know to them, imitators – of which potentially there are an unlimited number –
choose whether or not to enter, with the representative imitator producing Q  units of
output. If there are .  imitators, the profit of the original creator is
￿￿   	 VQ . Q Q ! &  
while an imitator who chooses to produce  I Q  receives a profit of
￿     	 	 II VQ.Q Q Q &    .
Our notion of equilibrium in this model is that of symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium. Given the number of entrants . , the individual imitators who have entered
must optimally choose the identical output level Q . Given the initial production run by
the innovator,  ￿ Q  and the dependence of Q  on . , the decision of imitators to enter must
be optimal. That is, .  must be chosen so that imitators’ profit is non-negative, and so
that any larger number of entrants   ..   yields negative profits. As a computational
aid, we will allow .  to take on non-integer values, and (since Q  is well defined in this
case), calculate the equilibrium number of imitators to be that unique number that leads
to zero profit. Finally, given all of this, the creator decides to create only if it is possible
to earn a non-negative profit, and must choose  ￿ Q  optimally, given that the number of
imitators and their output will follow the equilibrium response.
3. Solving the Model
As the equilibrium we are interested in is the subgame perfect one, we should
solve the model by backwards induction.
Theorem 1: Industry output is given by
                                                
8 Maurer and Scotchmer [2002] use a similar model albeit to study the commitment consequences of
licensing rather than the role of the marginal innovator. Here commitment takes place through the choice of
scale by the innovator. Because we are interested in the marginal innovator, we consider a continuum of
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If   V& b  then the innovator preempts the market by setting  ￿  Q  , earns monopoly
profit margin of V  and a total profit of   V . If   V& b  the “marginal innovative firm”
is given by  ￿  	  V! & Q  ; creators with higher values enter, and those with lower
values stay out.
Proof: Start with the final stage in which there are .  entrants. To find the output of the
representative imitator, we compute the usual Cournot first order condition for the output








This condition determines total imitator output as a function of innovator output. Note
that  ￿   Q& V   is required to guarantee that there is entry with positive output
produced.







provided that this is greater than the monopoly output of ½. Otherwise, it would be
optimal for the creator to produce enough to bring industry output up to ½ and remain a
monopolist. This establishes the first result.
When total industry output is at least ½ , we conclude that the unit profit margin
in the industry is
V& .
If the innovator wishes to enter, it is optimal to preempt imitators by producing the entire
market output,
9 giving a profit to the innovator of
                                                
9 Of course, in practice there is some imitation, especially as time elapses, even if the innovator enters the
market with the Cournot equilibrium level of output. There are a variety of reasons for this, including the
ability of imitators to either make improvements or producing lower quality versions, and uncertainty about
imitators true costs. Adding to the model imitators who go for these segments scarcely enhances, and may
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Solving for zero innovator’s profit yields the solution for the “marginal innovative firm”.
Finally, if   V& b  then the target industry output would be below ½. This means
that the innovator preempts the market by setting  ￿  Q  , earns monopoly profit
margin of V  and a total profit of   V . Since this profit is less than or equal to &  it is
certainly less than !& , so the innovator would not choose to enter in this case. From this
we conclude that, under Cournot competition, the active firms are always and only those
with    V! &  , as implied by our definition of VQ .
;
4. Welfare Analysis
We now examine welfare under both Cournot competition, as described above,
and the case in which there is the possibility of obtaining a government monopoly.
Consider the social planner after the fixed cost of innovating has been sunk. Then
optimal output is  *1 q = , corresponding to  0 p =  and, excluding fixed cost, to a social
surplus 7  of V .  By way of contrast
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hence social surplus is always less than V , but increasing in the latter. More precisely,
social surplus at the equilibrium output is the integral under the demand curve (net of
marginal cost) between 0 and 1/ 2 Fv - , as computed above.
;
In particular, when V ld  the innovation will always take place as
￿  	  VV ! & Q p  , and the fraction of social surplus recovered by the simple
Cournot-competitive mechanism approaches one. That is to say: for each good that is
worth innovating, the social planner would choose an output of  *1 q = , while the9
Cournot-competitive mechanism chooses an output of 1/ 2 Fv - , which converges to 1
as V  grows. Hence, innovations with high social value not only are always implemented
in the absence of intellectual property, but most of their potential surplus is appropriated
by society through the Cournot-competitive mechanism.
Does this “competitive solution” always yield full social efficiency? No, it does
not, as the innovator and her imitators are “collective” monopolists in the equilibrium of
the Cournot game we have set them to play, hence they restrict output below the socially
efficient value of  *1 q = . Inefficiency here arises from the well-understood market power
of Cournot duopolists, and is not due to the monopoly power that intellectual property
bestows upon the original innovator. Indeed, had we assumed the original innovator is
assigned such legal right, she would be a sole monopolist and always supply just ½ units
of output, thereby engendering an even larger social inefficiency than under the Cournot
competition that the lack of intellectual property induces instead.
It is useful also to examine the degree of appropriability by the innovator, that is
the ratio of profits (gross, before fixed costs) obtained under the Cournot mechanism
























Because,   V&   is necessary if there is to be innovation, the degree of appropriability
by the innovator decreases as the social surplus of the innovation increases. In other
words, the “full appropriability by innovator” condition becomes less and less necessary
for creation to take place as the innovation being considered moves away from the
marginal one.
By way of contrast, and to clarify our earlier statement, suppose that the innovator
is shielded from competition by a legal monopoly. Then the monopolist’s profit is   V .10
The marginal innovating firm, indifferent to entry and innovating or staying out, is
 M V! &  . The social surplus generated by monopoly is 	V . In particular,
monopoly always yields ¾ of the social surplus, regardless of how valuable the
innovation is. That is, as V ld  the regime without intellectual property does
approximately 33% better than the one with intellectual property, and the absolute size of
the social loss grows without bound. Under which regime is there more innovation?
Everything else equal, under legal monopoly all innovations better than !&  are
implemented, while under (Cournot) competition only those better than  ￿  	   !& 
are. Because  ￿  	  !!   for   !   there are always more innovations under legal
monopoly, as would be expected. But this need not translate into more social surplus as
what is gained by having more innovations may be compensated, or more than
compensated when V  increases, by the under supply of copies of the new good. Finally,
while under competition, appropriability drops as the value of the innovation increases,
under monopoly it remains fixed at .
Next consider the case that is likely to arise in practice, where legal monopoly can
only be obtained at a cost. Suppose in particular that an additional fixed cost of B&  is
required to obtain a monopoly from government. This might, for example, represent the
cost of hiring lawyers to enforce a copyright or patent claim.  Under legal monopoly,
profits exceed those under Cournot competition by    VV & &  , so it is worth the
additional fixed cost if
   VV & & B &   p .
What then is the marginal firm willing to invest in a legal monopoly? It is given by
	

￿  - V& B  .
How is  - V  related to VQ , the marginal firm that will produce under competition? We see
that  - VV Q   if ￿  	 B! . When this is the case, the marginal firm in the market
will actually not choose to use intellectual property to maximize its profits, and a grant of
monopoly such as copyright will not help her: it serves merely to enrich the inframarginal
ones.11
5. Uncertain Success
So far we have examined the case in which the demand for a new product is
common knowledge among both creator and imitators. In practice, it is often argued that
there is uncertainty about the market value of a given innovation and that innovators must
pay the initial fixed cost under conditions of uncertainty. Imitators, on the other hand, can
wait to see if an innovation is a success or failure before deciding whether or not to
imitate. Here we begin addressing this issue by positing that at the time the initial
creation decision is made – at the time !&  must be committed – the social value V  is
uncertain and is drawn from a commonly known distribution. After the innovation takes
place, but before the decision to imitate and pay&  is undertaken, both the innovator and
the imitators learn the true value of V . Our goal is to study the extent to which shifts in
the distribution of V  affect appropriation.
Specifically, we suppose that V  is drawn from a common knowledge cumulative
distribution function ' . The specific value of V  is unknown prior to invention, and is
learned by both the inventor and imitators after the innovation takes place but before the
imitation decision is taken. Notice that whatever the value of V  that is drawn (provided it
is non-negative) the inventor will always choose to enter, whereas the imitator may
decide to stay out once uncertainty is resolved. That is, in our example of symmetric
Cournot imitation and linear demand where V  is known with certainty, the inventor only
produces if  ￿  	  VV ! & Q p  . Ex post after the fixed cost !&  has been paid,
however, it is a sunk cost, and the inventor should produce as long as   V p .
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representing the private value obtained by innovators for a given realization of the social
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then the (risk neutral) inventor will choose to innovate. Our goal is to examine whether
more marginal innovations – as measured by a '  that places greater weight on smaller
values of V  – in fact have the desirable property of having greater appropriability. That
is, our interest is in whether '  is decreasing as '  shifts to the right.
At this point we will drop the special assumption of Cournot competition and
linear demand, and examine more general appropriation functions that are compatible
with other market arrangements and, in particular, with the presence of positive external
effects from innovation. We assume that  	 GV  is strictly increasing, so that if there is
more social value, there is greater private value; that  	 GV V b  so that it is not possible to
appropriate more than the total social value (this excludes sizeable negative externalities),
that  	  GV p  so that the innovator never loses money by choosing to enter and, finally,
that  	 GV  is concave. Note that all the properties are satisfied in the linear-Cournot
example. Moreover, we can show that the concavity of  	 GV  implies non-increasing
appropriability when there is no uncertainty. Specifically, in the case of certainty,







Noting that a concave function is continuously differentiable except on a discrete set, we
can differentiate with respect to V  we get
￿￿






where by the mean value theorem  VV  . Since  	 GV  is concave   	  	 GV GV p , so
indeed   $G b .
 We are interested in the extent to which this result generalizes for non-degenerate
distributions of social value ' . A natural conjecture is that if ( first order stochastically
dominates '  then  (’ 'b ' . It turns out that this is not always the case. We can build
intuition by first considering the case where '  places weight on only two points: the
innovation is either a success yielding  ￿ V  with probability Q , or a failure yielding  ￿ V
with probability  Q  . Appropriability is then given by
￿￿
￿￿











Start with the special case in which  ￿  V  , so a failure results in no profit at all. Since








In this case if the distribution '  shifts to the right by increasing the probability of
success Q , then appropriability does not change. If the distribution of '  shifts to the
right by increasing the benefit of success  ￿ V , then appropriability falls.
Consider next the case in which  ￿  V  , with  ￿￿ 	  VG V p , and profitability
improves because the probability of the good outcome increases, that is, Q  increases.
Then we compute
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In other words, when failure is worth something, increasing the probability of success
reduces appropriability. This fits the initial intuition.
On the other hand, we can use the simple two point case to show that stochastic
dominance alone is not enough to keep appropriability from rising. Specifically, suppose
that  ￿ V  increases – we refer to this as “improving the dogs,” that is improving the
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The sign of 
￿ V $ ' is then the sign of
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   	   	 	  	  	  	 GV V V G V G V QQ Q Q    ,
that is the sign of
\^ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  	 	 ;  	  	= ;  	  	= G V V V GV GV G V V GV Q     .
This can go either way. Concavity implies the term in curly brackets is positive but it also
implies the second is negative because (0) 0 g = . Hence, for small values of p  the overall
expression is negative. On the other hand, if, as is true for the linear Cournot model,
	   GV Vl  as V ld , then for sufficiently large  ￿ V  and values of Q  near one, 
￿ V $ '14
will be positive. Improving the dogs, in other words, may increase rather than decrease
appropriability, although it does generate stochastic dominance.
From the two-point case, we have the intuition that it is increasing the social value
at the upper bound or its probability that decreases appropriability, whereas
appropriability may increase when the value of the worst innovations improves. Before
proving a result in this direction, we observe that increasing risk (increasing the
dispersion in the social value of innovations) lowers appropriability.
Theorem 3: If (  is a mean preserving spread of '  then  (’ 'b ' .







When we switch to (  since the spread is mean-preserving, the denominator does not
change, while the numerator decreases because G  is concave.
;
We can then prove the following rather crude result concerning decreasing
appropriability as social value increases. Define MAX’ V  to be the essential maximum –
that is the largest value in the support of ' .
Theorem 4: Suppose that  MAX (’ %V V   and that  	 GV  is not linear on ;MAX  = ’( V% V.
Then  (’ ' ' .
Proof: We already showed that  	  GV V is non-increasing. Let  MAX’ VV  . Hence for
















Finally, we observe that under our hypothesis  	   	  (( G% V % V GV V  . Since (  is a
mean preserving spread of the point mass at  ( %  we may apply Theorem 1 to get the
desired result.
;
6. Which Case is Empirically Relevant?
So, in practice, does a shift towards higher ex ante social value tend to increase or
decrease appropriability, in a general competitive setting?
Two industries which are notorious for having a great deal of ex ante uncertainty
are the film industry and the pharmaceutical industry. Here we examine data from the
film industry, as there is a reasonable and reasonably available measure of both ex ante
expected social value and ex post social value. First observe that because of copyright,
the film industry effectively operates under monopoly, not competition. Consequently,
according to our model, the industry should capture a constant fraction of social value
independent of how great that social value is. So we can use observed profits as a proxy
for social value. We then pose the question: if the industry were instead to operate under
competition, would appropriability be increasing or decreasing with social value?
Our measure of ex ante expected social value is the budget (BUDGET) of the
film.  The budget is front money provided by investors and, because of the way the
industry works, it does not represent the social cost of production but rather represents
the belief of the investors as to the expected return on the film. In fact, as we discuss
below, much of the budget goes to rents above opportunity costs for such factors of
production as big movie stars and directors. Our measure of ex post social value is the
U.S. box office gross of the film (REVENUE).
Does the budget measure ex ante expected social value? First, we investigate
whether the budget is in fact a measure of expected box office gross. We attack this
problem in several different ways. We use an OLS regression to see if the expected value
of REVENUE is indeed equal to BUDGET. Then we use data on sequels to successful
films to argue that a substantial portion of BUDGET includes monopolistic rents.
Examining an OLS regression of revenues on budget (in millions) for 2,204 films
we see that16
REVENUE = 12.59 + 1.082 * BUDGET  ( ￿  2  )
                      (1.488)  (.00371)
where standard errors are in parenthesis. Note that the high intercept term indicates that
small budget films have higher rates of return than large budget films. The most likely
explanation of this is sample selection bias: high budget films are far more likely to have
data on revenue and budget available. Low budget films are likely to be reported only if
they are successful, otherwise they tend to disappear from the radar. Note that the high
intercept is not due to large budget films earning more overseas than small budget films:
if we examine the observations for which both U.S. and World Grosses are available, we
find that the ratio of World to U.S. declines slightly with the size of the budget. It may be,
however, that other forms of revenue, DVD sales and merchandising, are relatively more
important for large budget films. In any case, this regression suggests that budgets are a
pretty good measure of ex-ante expected revenues.
To further examine the extent to which the “budget” of a film might reflect the
social cost of making the film consider that in general intellectual property allows scarce
factors such as the big stars and great directors to command a portion of the monopolistic
rents. These rents appear to be substantial, leading to a total cost that is greatly higher
than the opportunity cost, so that this component of the budget does not reflect social
cost. Of course larger budget films generally do involve higher costs such as more
elaborate sets and more expensive locations, which do reflect social cost.
One way to examine our claim would be by comparing current salaries for stars to
those of stars in the early years of film, when movie stars were probably scarcer but
monopoly rents were certainly smaller because IP protection was weaker and the market
size was an order of magnitude smaller than it currently is. It is hard to argue that such
great actors as Charles Chaplin or Humphrey Bogart were in some way inferior to current
stars. Such data not being available, though, one must get by with the impressionistic fact
that monopolistic rents accruing to stars have increased ten-fold while their social
(opportunity) cost decreased somewhat. However, a more direct method to quantify the
relevance of monopolistic rents in the appropriation rate of movies is to examine the
budgets of sequels to successful films.17
Date Film Producer Budget US Gross World
Gross
6/23/89 Batman Warner Bros. $35M $251M $413M
6/19/92 Batman Returns Warner Bros. $80M $162M $282M
5/25/77 Star Wars 20th  Century
Fox
$11M $460M $797M
5/21/80 Empire Strikes Back 20th  Century
Fox
$23M $290M $534M
7/14/99 Blair Witch Project Artisan $.035M $140M $248M
10/27/0
0
Book of Shadows: Blair
Witch 2
Artisan $15M $26M $47M
9/26/86 Crocodile Dundee Paramount $5M $174M $328M
4/20/01 Crocodile Dundee in
Los Angeles
Paramount $25M $25M $39M
6/20/75 Jaws Universal $12M $260M $470M
6/16/78 Jaws 2 Universal $20M $102M $208M
3/21/80 Mad Max Filmways $.2M $8M $99M
5/21/82 Mad Max 2 Warner Bros. $2M $24M Unknown
The key fact is that the budget for a sequel is much higher – generally double or more –
the budget of the original – although the revenues are generally less. There is no reason a
sequel should require a greater social cost, so we take this as evidence that the budget
reflects primarily rents to the scarce factors: the stars, directors and owners of the rights
to the original.
Appropriability and ex ante uncertainty: Can we apply Theorem 4 to the film
industry and conclude that higher budget films yield both higher social surplus and, in the
absence of IP, would command less appropriability? The striking fact about the film data
is that despite the importance of several low budget high revenue outliers – the Blair
Witch Project is the extreme example having a budget of only $35,000 and a U.S. Box
Office of $140,539,099 – we can nevertheless apply Theorem 4. In particular, no film18
with a budget of less than $1.488 million
10 (213 movies in the sample) ever earned
revenues equal to the average revenue of films with budgets of $142-160 million – these
films on average earned $149,916,667. In other words, large budget films do not simply
increase the revenues relative to small budget films, but they increase the probability and
value of success as well. This means that, were movies not covered by the legal
monopoly of copyright as they are, decreasing appropriability would emerge under
Cournot-competition. This is reinforced by an examination of the revenues earned by the
top 10% within each budget category. In the $1.8-2.1 million budget category the top
10% earned on average $26.5 million; in the $10 million budget category, the top 10%
earned on average $74.6 million; while in the $90-110 million budget category, the top
10% earned $327 million.
Recall why decreasing appropriability is relevant in our context: it signals that
approximate, or asymptotic, efficiency can be obtained under conditions of competition
and that the full-appropriation requirement, while sufficient, is certainly not necessary.
The data suggests that our assumptions are likely to be satisfied in the movie industry.
7. Conclusions
Appropriability of social surplus being at the core of the private incentives to
innovate, one is naturally interested in the relation between degree of appropriability and
efficiency under different market arrangements. Motivated by the work of Ostroy and
Makowski, we study the relation between degree of appropriability and social value of
innovation in a model with free entry and imitation in which the innovator and her
competitors compete a-la Cournot. We derive the conditions under which the Cournot
allocation is socially more efficient than the one that obtains when the innovator holds a
legal monopoly.
We also examine uncertainty about the social value of innovation. When there is
no uncertainty the degree of appropriability decreases with the value of the innovation.
When the social value is uncertain for the innovator, but revealed to imitators before they
decide to enter or not, appropriability may not necessarily decrease with the value of
innovation, at least for general distributions of the uncertain value of the innovation. In
particular, when the expected value of the innovation increases because either the
                                                
10 The budget of Snow White.19
probability or the size of the “good” outcomes increases, appropriability decreases. The
opposite occurs when the expected value increases because the bad outcomes improve.
In general a mean-preserving increase in risk lowers appropriability. We use this
fact to derive conditions under which a general competitive appropriability function is
decreasing in the (expected) social value of the innovation. We then examine data from
Hollywood movies: despite the notorious ex ante uncertainty about the success of films,
we show that even in this industry the conditions for decreasing appropriability with
increased social value is satisfied.20
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